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LECTURE 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN CANADA♦ 
 
The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C.,  
Chief Justice of Canada∗ 
 
 
This lecture scans the development of human rights law in Canada from a 
period of judicially implied rights, to the era of legislative protection, and 
finally to the status quo of constitutional entrenchment. Progress to this final 
stage has ensured that human rights are not threatened in Canada. 
Nevertheless, significant challenges have arisen: The first involves a 
challenge between advocates of civil liberties and advocates of anti-
discrimination rights. The second growing challenge is the practice of 
removing human rights from judicial review to specialized tribunals free 
from judicial scrutiny in the interests of national security. The third 
challenge lies in applying the concept of accommodation inherent in anti-
discrimination rights in our increasingly diverse, multi-cultural societies.  
Through our legal institutions and our institutions of citizenship and 
community inclusion, these challenges can be acknowledged and brought 
into the democratic dialogue, thereby ensuring that human rights can be 
strengthened and sustained.  
 
                                                           
♦ © 2009 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Published with permission 
of the author. 
∗ The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada. The Chief 
Justice’s remarks were delivered at the Fourth Annual Human Rights Lecture of the 
Law Society of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland, May 7, 2008. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a great honour to be asked to deliver the 4th Annual Law 
Society of Ireland Human Rights Lecture. 
I came to law almost by accident, and to human rights late in 
my career. Having completed my BA hon., I was uncertain what to 
do. Someone said, “What about law?”. So, without really believing I 
could be a lawyer, I wrote to the Dean of the University of Alberta 
law School, asking for information. He wrote back: “You’re accepted”. 
So when September came, I decided to give it a try. 
Human rights came even later. Of course I knew what they 
were, but it was not until I became a trial judge, and came to share 
vicariously, day in and day out, the experiences of the men and 
women who passed through my courtroom, that I began to appreciate 
the fundamental importance of human rights. To be sure, I had not 
reached that point in my life and career without encountering 
stereotypical attitudes. But it was judging that brought the persistence 
and perniciousness of inegalitarian and discriminatory thinking home 
to me. 
Discrimination, I came to see, was not confined to the overt 
evils of racism and ethnic cleansing — although sadly the world still 
knows these. Casual marginalization and inadvertent devaluation — 
these too were forms of discrimination and for all their subtlety, 
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capable of perpetuating prejudice, disadvantage and unfair denial of 
opportunity. 
Tonight, as you know, my topic is human rights. In the first 
part of my talk, I will discuss briefly what we mean by human rights 
and will talk about the history of protections for human rights in 
Canada, from a few unwritten rights to a constitutionally entrenched 
Charter which we have now had for 25 years.  In the second part, I 
will suggest that while we may feel justifiedly proud about our 
achievements in securing human rights, they are not as secure as we 
sometimes assume, and important challenges face us.    
 Human rights are rights founded on a simple but profound 
idea — that every individual possesses equal worth and is equally 
entitled to respect. This simple idea has given rise to two types of 
human rights: one based on liberty, the other on the right to equal 
treatment. Rights that are based on liberty focus on individual rights 
and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, and rights to be free of 
unreasonable seizure and detention, such as habeas corpus. These 
rights we call civil liberties.  Rights that focus on equal treatment, by 
contrast, are aimed at ensuring individuals are not denied the benefit 
of law or equality of treatment because of personal characteristics or 
circumstances related to membership in a minority or disadvantaged 
group, such as race, religion, gender or ethnic origin. These rights are 
called anti-discrimination rights. 
Human rights of both types have old, indeed ancient, roots. 
They are grounded in the work of thinkers and scholars that have 
preceded us, from the ancient Greeks onward.  They have grown 
strong and borne fruit through historic struggles like the struggle 
against slavery.  But human rights are also new.  Only in recent 
generations have nations enshrined the fundamental freedoms of their 
citizens in constitutions.  The US did this in 1791, Ireland in 1937, 
Canada in 1982.  And only in the last 60 years or so has the anti-
discrimination right been recognized by the law, beginning with the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 
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II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA 
 
Having identified the subject-matter generally, let me turn to 
Canada’s experience with human rights. Canada’s experience can be 
divided into three phases: 1) Judicially implied rights; 2) Legislatively 
protected rights; and  3) Constitutionally protected human rights. 
 
A. JUDICIALLY IMPLIED RIGHTS 
Canada’s 1867 Constitution, while grounded in the rule of law 
and democratic governance, did not provide for or protect human 
rights, whether civil liberties or anti-discrimination rights. But in the 
tradition of the Common Law, courts sometimes found these rights 
implied, even striking out laws under the principle of freedom of 
expression. Still, this left many denials of rights unrecognized and 
unremedied, such as the detention of persons considered to be “enemy 
aliens” during the Second World War, and the detention of thousands 
of Quebecers on the basis of suspicion of sympathy with separatists 
during the 1970's. Nor did this prevent grievous intrusions on the 
liberties of Aboriginal peoples.  
Before human rights legislation and the Charter, courts in 
Canada relied on the theory of an “implied bill of rights” to protect 
traditional civil liberties such as freedom of speech and association.  
The theoretical foundation for these rights was the importance of free 
political speech and discussion in a democracy.  Because such 
discussion is necessary to the functioning of democratic institutions, 
the argument went, it must be implicitly guaranteed as essential to the 
functioning of democratic institutions.1  Thus, in 1938, in the Alberta 
Press case,2 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a provincial 
legislature could not require newspapers to give the government a 
right of reply to criticism of provincial policies.  In a 1953 case called 
Saumur v. Quebec,3 a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged 
a Quebec municipal by-law that forbade the distribution of pamphlets 
                                                           
1 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd. 2007) at 
34-10 to 34-13; The Hon. Robert Sharpe and Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 9-11 . 
2 Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.  
3 Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299.  
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without the prior permission of the chief of police.  The Supreme 
Court of Canada struck down the by-law on the basis that it amounted 
to a government power to censor political speech, which was 
inconsistent with democratic government.  And in 1957, in a case 
called Switzman v. Elbling,4 the Supreme Court held that a province 
could not prohibit the use of a house to propagate communism.    
These decisions constituted an important recognition of civil 
liberties.  But the protection of the implied bill of rights was limited, 
and uncertain.   
It was limited in the rights it protected.  It was applied in only 
a few cases.  Indeed, the three cases I have mentioned are the only 
cases in which the Supreme Court relied on the theory of the implied 
bill of rights to strike down government action which restricted 
freedom of speech or religion.   
The implied bill of rights was also limited in that it only 
protected classic liberal rights such as the right to freedom of speech 
and freedom of assembly.  These rights are, of course, fundamentally 
important, but they do not capture the full panoply of what we think 
of when we talk about human rights today.   
The protection offered by the implied bill of rights approach 
was also uncertain.  As it was not codified either in legislation or in 
the Constitution, its scope was unclear, and judges resorted to it in 
only a handful of cases.  Presumably these were cases where judges 
viewed the government’s actions as particularly egregious.  Thus, 
while the implied bill of rights did protect rights in some important 
cases, it did not provide for consistent protection of human rights. 
 
B. LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The modern human rights movement in Canada, and around 
the world, sprang from the ashes of the Second World War.  In 
response to the atrocities of the Holocaust and the totalitarian regimes 
of the Axis powers, early proponents of human rights advocated 
creating domestic and international laws to recognize and protect the 
inherent dignity of the human person.   
Internationally, the United Nations adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.  A Canadian law professor and 
                                                           
4 Switzman v. Elbing and A.G. of Quebec, [1957] S.C.R. 285.  
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diplomat, John Humphrey, wrote the first draft of the Universal 
Declaration, and jurists and diplomats from many countries were 
instrumental in its adoption.5 This was followed in 1966 with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.6 
The basic principle underlying the human rights movement is 
briefly yet eloquently stated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights:  
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
 
Canada was an early leader in the human rights movement.  
At home, Canada’s first Bill of Rights was enacted in Saskatchewan in 
1947.7 Other provinces followed suit with Bills of Rights and Human 
Rights Codes from the 1950's through the 1970's.8   
Although there is some overlap between Bills of Rights and 
Human Rights Codes, generally Bills of Rights protect individuals 
from governments breaching their rights, while Human Rights Codes 
generally deal with private action.    
This second stage of human rights development in Canada can 
be characterized as a period of growth.  As more and more provinces 
passed Human Rights Codes, the types of rights protected expanded, 
as did people’s consciousness of their rights.  Early provincial Bills of 
Rights protected traditional notions of rights, such as freedom of 
speech, press, assembly, religion and association.  As human rights law 
developed, codes expanded to cover the right to be free from 
discrimination in areas such as employment and housing.  
Statutory Human Rights Codes have had lasting success in 
protecting against discrimination in the private sector.  However, 
statutory Bills of Rights did not have the same success when it came to 
protecting individual rights against infringement by government.   As 
important as legislation protecting civil liberties and human rights is, 
                                                           
5 William Schabas, “Canada and the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 403; Michael Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto: 
House of Anansi Press, 2000) at 10. 
6 Sharpe and Roach, supra note 1 at 14-15. 
7 S.S. 1947, c. 35.  Repealed and replaced by the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, 
S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1. 
8 Hogg, supra note 1 at 34-7 and 34-8 
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it has a major limitation.  Courts have described human rights 
legislation as quasi-constitutional.  Yet for all that, it is still legislation.  
If government chooses to pass other legislation which takes away 
from human rights protection, it is free to do so.  This problem can be 
seen most clearly in the ultimate failure of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights.9   
Often referred to as the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights, the 
Canadian Bill of Rights was passed in 1960.  Its reach, on paper, was 
large. It protected fundamental freedoms such as freedom of religion, 
speech, assembly and association as well as legal rights, including 
protections against arbitrary detention and imprisonment, and the 
right to counsel.  It also guaranteed equality “before the law.”  Yet it 
was also limited. The Canadian Bill of Rights only applied to the 
federal government, not to the provinces.  Further, it was contained 
in ordinary legislation, not constitutionally entrenched.  This led the 
courts to interpret it narrowly.  Where the right claimed by a person 
conflicted with existing law, the Canadian Bill of Rights was generally 
read as not creating new rights.  In the 22 years between the 
enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights, and the adoption of the 
Charter, in only one case did the Supreme Court strike down a law for 
breach of the Bill of Rights.10 
In the result, the Canadian Bill of Rights is now widely seen as 
a failure. 
 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
This leads me to the third stage of human rights protection in 
Canada, the constitutional entrenchment of human rights.  In the 
wake of the failure of the Canadian Bill of Rights, many believed that 
human rights protection would be truly effective only if it was 
entrenched in the Constitution.  Thus when, following years of on-
again off-again constitutional negotiations, the Constitution of Canada 
was repatriated in 1982, the country included the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act, 1982.   
                                                           
9 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
10 Hogg, supra at 35-10; R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282. 
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The Charter protects many of the same rights that were in the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, such as freedom of religion, speech, 
association and assembly, and legal rights, as well as a number of new 
rights — a broadened equality guarantee, guarantees of language 
rights, minority language education rights, and Aboriginal rights.  But 
the biggest change is that the Charter, unlike previous Bills of Rights 
in Canada, is part of the Constitution.  The Constitution is the 
supreme law of Canada.  It cannot be repealed  —  at least not without 
great difficulty  —  and all other laws must comply with it.  And 
unlike the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Charter applies to both the 
federal government and the provinces.    
 Supported by the Constitutional entrenchment of the Charter, 
the courts gave a broad and purposive interpretation to the rights it 
guaranteed.  If existing laws did not comply with the rights in the 
Charter, then those laws had to change.  If government action did not 
comply with the Charter, then government had to change the way it 
acted.   
The project of protecting individual rights in a democracy 
does not mean the interests of society as a whole are ignored.  The 
Charter contains an express provision that allows the government to 
pass laws which limit constitutional rights if the government can 
justify the reasons for the limit.  In this regard, the structure of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is similar to many modern 
constitutions, including the European Convention on Human 
Rights.11       
Section 1 of the Charter provides that the rights contained in 
the Charter are subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”  This 
does not mean that the government can run roughshod over 
individual rights.  Rather, it requires that the government justify 
limits on rights.  Limits must be prescribed by law.  This ensures that 
the limits on rights are knowable and fixed.  There must be an 
important societal objective which justifies limiting rights.  There 
must be a rational connection between the limit on rights and the 
                                                           
11 Lorraine Weinrib, “Canada’s Charter: Comparative Influences, International 
Stature”, in The Charter at Twenty, Debra McAllister and Adam Dodek eds., Ontario 
Bar Association (2002) at 495-98; William Schabas and Stéphane Beaulac, 
International Human Rights and Canadian Law, Thomson Carswell (2007) at 255-59. 
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legislative objective.  And most importantly, there must be 
proportionality between the government objective and the limit on 
rights – rights must be limited no more than necessary to achieve the 
government objective.  Through this exercise of justification, the 
Charter       
o, how 
to ensu
mmodating difference.  It is to these two challenges 
that I now turn. 
 
 permits a balancing of individual rights and societal needs.         
Another reason I believe the Charter provides effective rights 
protection in Canada is that it has been interpreted to give each 
branch of government a role in rights protection.  Human rights 
protection and the Charter are not the work of the courts alone.  The 
courts rule on whether the Charter has been complied with or 
breached in specific cases, either by unconstitutional legislation, or by 
government actions.  But the government and the legislatures must 
also consider the Charter.  In passing legislation and carrying out 
government actions, both the executive and the legislature must give 
consideration to whether their actions comply with the Charter.  And 
if in a particular case the courts strike down a law because it does not 
comply with the Charter, the government and the legislature must 
consider whether to enact new legislation in response, and if s
re that the new legislation complies with the Charter.   
So, that is where we have been.  Where are we going?  What 
are the current challenges and future directions of human rights law 
in Canada?  The most serious challenge I see is not just a Canadian 
challenge, but a challenge for every modern state determined to 
protect human rights — the challenge of incorporating ideas of 
multiculturalism, difference, and tolerance into human rights 
protection.  A secondary challenge flowing from this challenge is 
institutional.  It is the task of the courts and of legal tribunals to define 
the difficult accommodations that maintaining human rights in a 
multi-cultural context impose.  This plants them firmly at the center 
of controversial political debates about how far a particular society 
should go in acco
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III 
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 
Human rights are not threatened in Canada.  But neither are 
they fully secure. They cannot be taken for granted. Recent decades 
reveal three growing challenges. The first challenge is the tension 
between advocates of civil liberties and advocates of anti-
discrimination rights. The second growing challenge is the practice of 
removing human rights from judicial review to specialized tribunals 
free from judicial scrutiny, in the interests of national security. The 
third challenge lies in applying the concept of accommodation 
inherent in anti-discrimination rights in our increasingly diverse, 
multi-cultural societies. 
A. ION OF 
CIVIL N AGAINST 
 human rights must 
recogni
                                                           
 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE TENSION BETWEEN PROTECT
LIBERTIES AND PROTECTIO
DISCRIMINATION 
We sometimes hear people talk of civil liberties versus anti-
discrimination equality rights —  “individual rights” versus “group 
rights” — as though they are incompatible. The suggestion is that one 
is more important than the other, and that the practice of human 
rights must choose between them. This is a false dichotomy. It is not a 
question of “either/or”. A full, inclusive vision of
ze both civil liberties and equality rights.  
This said, tensions between the two types of human rights — 
individual-based civil liberties on the one hand and group-based 
equality rights on the other — are real, and must be resolved. Anti-
discrimination rights can be taken to imply that criticism or 
denigration, direct or indirect, of minority groups is off-bounds. This 
may conflict with the basic civil liberties, notably freedom of 
expression.  In Keegstra,12 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld anti-
hate laws as constitutional and justified.  In Zundel,13 by contrast, the 
Supreme Court of Canada struck down “false-news” laws as violative 
of free speech. Generally, the Court has drawn the line so as to permit 
12 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
13 R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731. 
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ourts and tribunals may be called on to 
determi
nsiderable 
debate 
y. Justice has 
been preserved. The need to respect difference has been 
a
 
dominate the news. You in Ireland know all too well the destructive 
                                                           
t level of criticism.  Freedom of expression is highly valued; 
intrusions must be strictly justified.  
None of us would or should condone the slander of a 
particular religion or ethnic group. Nor should we be blind to the 
harm this can cause, both to the affected group and to social harmony.  
But by the same token, the right to debate and discuss ideas, upon 
which democracy and our ability to live together rests, must be 
preserved. When freedom of expression conflicts with other rights or 
interests, it falls to those seeking to limit the right to free expression 
to justify the limit. C
ne whether the proposed limit is justified. In this way, the 
dispute is resolved.  
However, tensions continue.  Recently, several Canadian 
Human Rights Commissions have taken speech that is alleged to 
denigrate a particular group to task. In a Canadian take on the Danish 
cartoons issue that recently dominated the European press, a publisher 
published cartoons that were said to blaspheme the Prophet, and was 
brought up before the Alberta Human Rights Commission.14 Members 
of the Muslim community filed a human rights complaint alleging 
that the cartoons constituted promotion of racial or ethnic hatred.  
The proceedings were ultimately dropped, but generated co
on where the line should be drawn between free speech and 
maintaining a respectful attitude toward minority beliefs.   
These and similar cases show that not everyone agrees on 
where the line is to be drawn. But thus far, I believe we can say that 
in Canada it has been drawn in a fair and principled wa
cknowledged. Peaceful co-existence has been affirmed. 
B. THE CHALLENGE OF MAINTAINING NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
We live in an era of terrorism. Concerns for national security 
14 “Western Canadian magazine publishes Muhammad cartoons”, CBC News, 
February 13, 2006, online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/02/13/cartoons060213.html>; 
“Muslim leader drops Ezra Levant cartoon complaint”, National Post, February 12, 
2008, online: <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=303895>. 
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impact of dedicated and ruthless terrorists and the threat they pose to 
peaceful democratic governance. Terrorism, we all agree, must be 
fought. 
s must 
conform
etention outside 
the dom
c
                                                           
 
However, this poses a challenge for human rights. Human 
rights may be attenuated and indeed denied as a result of security 
fears and concerns. This may be done by executive action or 
legislation. The power of elected officials to enact laws limiting rights 
to the extent as may be reasonable and necessary to combat terrorism 
cannot be denied. However, in a democracy, these action
 to the constitution and be subject to judicial review.  
My point is simple: to preserve human rights while fighting 
terrorism, we cannot deny the courts, the traditional protectors of 
human rights, the right to independently review executive and 
legislative decisions affecting the rights of persons suspected of being 
threats to security, or we risk casting these persons into legal black 
holes. We must not place our policies and places of d
ain of the courts and beyond judicial review. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken the position that this 
annot happen. In dealing with security certificate laws, in the 
Charkaoui case,15 the Court insisted that the state justify deprivations 
of liberty of immigrants alleged to be terrorists. To admit that there 
are zones where individuals are not protected stands in direct 
contradiction to the fundamental principle of human rights that all 
human beings are of equal worth and should be treated accordingly. 
Judicial review is the condition precedent of human rights. The 
matter, to be sure, is not simple. There may be documents or secrets 
that cannot be fully disclosed to the parties for security reasons, for 
example. But the bottom line is that when the state seeks to deprive a 
person of his or her liberty, there must be meaningful judicial review. 
In the recent Khadr case,16 the Court re-asserted the overriding 
importance of judicial review in the protection of human rights. The 
case concerned Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen detained by U.S. 
forces at Guantanamo Bay since 2002, and now being prosecuted by 
the U.S. on terrorism-related charges. Canadian intelligence agents 
interviewed Mr. Khadr in Guantanamo, and subsequently handed 
over the products of these interviews to U.S. authorities. The Court 
15 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350. 
16 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, 2008 SCC 28. 
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held that Mr. Khadr was entitled to disclosure of the interview 
documents passed on to the U.S. authorities, because Canada had 
participated in a process that was contrary to its international human 
rights obligations. Under these circumstances, the Charter, and the 
courts’ ability to hold government action to human rights standards, 
could exceptionally apply outside of Canada. 
 
itional ways and new ways that may seem strange, even 
wrong.  
rsification of 
Canadia
conflicts such as these come before the courts, judges are called upon 
                                                           
 
C. THE CHALLENGE OF ACCOMMODATION 
Canada is by history a nation of diverse cultures and 
ethnicities. But even countries that do not have histories of colonial 
conquest and generational immigration, such as Ireland, face the 
challenge of diversity.  World populations are, quite literally, on the 
move.  Increasingly, we are all confronted by the other in our midst, 
forced, whether we like it or not, to find accommodations between 
our trad
Against this background, let me return to the Canadian 
situation.  Many of the human rights protected by Canada’s Human 
Rights Codes and the Charter focus on diversity.  Section 2(a) protects 
freedom of religion.  Section 15 of the Charter makes it clear that all 
individuals in Canada, regardless of race, religion, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, sex, age or physical or mental disability, are to be 
considered equal.  Section 27 provides that the Charter is to be 
“interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and 
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”.  Other 
sections protect minority language and education rights, and 
Aboriginal rights.17 It follows that the increasing dive
n society will affect the interpretation of rights.  
It is inevitable that rights as diverse as these may lead to on-
the-ground conflicts.  Sometimes the conflict is between different 
rights.  Freedom of religion may conflict with gender equality, for 
example, or it may run up against freedom of speech.  Sometimes the 
conflict may not be between rights, but between a particular right and 
a societal interest, such as security or freedom of contract. When 
17 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 16-23, 25, 35. 
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to reconcile and balance the competing claims, a process we refer to as 
reasonable accommodation.   
A recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada presents a 
graphic example of the complexity of the competing demands that can 
result from a commitment to protecting human rights in a multi-
cultural society.  In a 2006 decision, known as the Multani case, the 
Court considered the issue of whether a Sikh student, whose religion 
required him to wear a kirpan, should be permitted to wear it while 
he attended public school.18 A kirpan is a religious object that 
resembles a dagger, and must be made of metal.  The case, brought 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and under the 
Quebec provincial Charter, required the Court to weigh freedom of 
religion against student safety in public schools. 
Mr. Multani and his family claimed that the Charter guarantee 
of freedom of religion protected his right to wear the kirpan.  The 
school board, on the other hand, argued that he should not be 
permitted to carry a kirpan because it contravened a code of conduct 
which prohibited students from carrying weapons and dangerous 
objects.  What tipped the scale for the Court was that the evidence did 
not support the conclusion that the kirpan, which was sewn inside a 
small pocket inside the boy’s clothing, posed a real risk to the security 
in the school.  In fact, it posed no more risk than many objects that 
are readily available in schools, such as scissors, compasses, baseball 
bats and table  knives  in  the  school  cafeteria.  It followed that the 
school board had not established that the restriction on Mr. Multani’s 
religious duty was reasonably necessary, and the board was 
consequently required to accommodate his religious practice by 
letting him carry the kirpan.  The Court interpreted freedom of 
religion broadly, as protecting beliefs or practices that an individual 
sincerely believes are required by his or her religion.  Yet it also stated 
that freedom of religion is subject to reasonable limits, which it is for 
the government to justify.  To allow the student to carry a bare kirpan 
might well have been unreasonable.  But by accommodating the way 
he exercised his religious right in order to meet security concerns, Mr. 
Multani satisfied those security concerns put against him.  In the end, 
both freedom of religion and security were protected. 
                                                           
18 Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court underlined the 
importance of respect and tolerance for different beliefs in a 
democratic society: 
An absolute prohibition [on wearing the kirpan] would 
stifle the promotion of values such as multiculturalism, 
diversity, and the development of an educational culture 
respectful of the rights of others.19 
 
Another example of the tensions between rights protection 
and diversity is provided by a case heard last year, which required the 
Court to decide whether a term of a negotiated civil divorce 
settlement requiring the husband to give his wife a Jewish religious 
divorce (a get) was enforceable in the civil courts such that the 
husband could be required to pay damages for not complying with the 
settlement.20  
 The husband claimed that requiring him to pay damages for 
not giving the get violated his right to freedom of religion.  The wife 
claimed that the settlement was freely entered into, and the husband 
should pay damages for not complying with it.  She claimed that his 
breach of the settlement caused her harm and violated her right to 
equality, because unless he gave her a religious divorce, she could not 
remarry in her faith.  Thus, the case raised competing claims of 
religious freedom, gender equality, the relationship between religion 
and the state, and how these things impact on a contract freely 
entered into.   
The majority of the Court decided that the term in the 
settlement requiring the husband to give the get was valid and 
enforceable.  As a result the husband was required to pay the wife 
damages for breaching it.  If the husband’s right to religious freedom 
was violated – which was not clear, because the evidence suggested he 
may have refused to give the get out of anger at his wife, rather than 
for religious reasons –  the violation was justified by the competing 
values of equality, and the modern Canadian approach to the right to 
marry and divorce, which allows individuals to decide for themselves 
when their marriage is irretrievably broken, and lets them move on 
with their lives – rights given equally to women and men. 
                                                           
19 Multani, supra at 297. 
20 Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54. 
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The issues raised by the case highlight some of the 
complexities and challenges of rights protection in a multicultural 
society.  As the majority noted: 
 
Determining when the assertion of a right based on 
difference must yield to a more pressing public interest is a 
complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright- 
line application. It is, at the same time, a delicate necessity 
for protecting the evolutionary integrity of both 
multiculturalism and public confidence in its importance.21 
 
I have mentioned two Canadian cases that illustrate the 
difficult and delicate questions that emerge when human rights are 
applied in a diverse, multi-cultural society.  Similar cases have made 
headlines in Europe and others parts of the world.  We are all familiar 
with the debate about headscarves in France, or the condemnation of 
the Danish publisher who published cartoons many believed 
defamatory of the Prophet (the same cartoons that figured in the 
Western Standard case in Canada which I mentioned earlier).  As our 
countries become ever more diverse, such clashes can only be 
expected to increase. 
In the Canadian province of Quebec, which places great store 
in its distinctive culture, the debate over cases such as those I have 
discussed rose to the point where the Province appointed a royal 
commission to inquire into the subject of reasonable accommodation 
of religious and cultural minorities. The commission provoked a 
heated public dialogue about the accommodation of differences,22 not 
always easy issues to discuss, as they deal with sensitive issues of 
individual and group identity.   The commissioners crossed and criss-
crossed the Province, hearing the views of citizens and interested 
groups.  Some of the comments they heard were harsh, bordering on 
the xenophobic.  But many were supportive of the vision of a tolerant 
society, in which people of different faiths and creeds can live and 
work together through the ethic of human rights and reasonable 
                                                           
21 Bruker v. Marcovitz, supra at para. 2, per Abella J. 
22 Order in Council Concerning the Establishment of the Consultation Commission on 
Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences, O.C. 95-2007. 
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accommodation. The commission’s final report concluded that 
“integration through pluralism, equality and reciprocity is by far the 
most commendable, reasonable course”.  The commission 
recommended adopting the values of interculturalism and open 
secularism as a way to develop a shared identity based on a citizen 
culture.23 These are complex and difficult concepts, which makes it is 
all the more necessary for all citizens to be involved in the public 
dialogue.  
One thing seems certain; protecting human rights in a diverse 
multicultural society is an endeavour in which all our institutions 
must engage, chief among them our legal institutions. 
 Far from destroying our collective national and community 
identities, human rights both pre-suppose those identities and sustain 
them.   While we like to say each person is born with rights, in 
historical terms rights are a social construct, a product of history, of 
ideas, of struggles and of institutions.  Moreover, in functional terms, 
human rights presuppose and can only be effective in a community or 
nation where there is general acceptance by all that “we are all in this 
together”.24 To work properly, the idea of human rights presupposes a 
degree of cultural solidarity.  As citizens, we have special obligations 
to each other.  One of those obligations is to respect the differences of 
our co-citizens and to accommodate their religious and cultural rights 
insofar as this can reasonably be done.  Citizens compromise because 
they recognize that this is a responsibility that society imposes on 
them as the correlative of their enjoyment of their own rights.  The 
rights asserted by some citizens must connect with the obligation felt 
by others, if human rights are to be sustained.  This pre-supposes a 
sense of communal identity, and in the end strengthens it. 
Thus human rights should not be seen as undermining our 
common identities and national commitments.  On the contrary, for 
human rights to work we need nation-states and a sense of adherence 
to nation-states.  And we need to find ways to encourage the 
minorities within those states to identify with the larger whole.  Until 
                                                           
23 G. Bouchard, C. Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, <online: 
http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-abrege-
en.pdf>, at pp. 93-4. 
24 Goodhart, “Has Multiculturalism Had Its Day?”  Literary Review of Canada, Vol. 16, 
April 2008 3 at p. 4 
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recent times, the basis of this shared identity “would have been 
mainly ethnicity – shared ancestry, history, sacrifice and myths.  In 
multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies the basis of specialness is the 
thinner fabric of citizenship itself.”25 
 Canada, which accepts more immigrants per capita than any 
other nation of the world, recognizes this.26 Every immigrant has the 
right to become a citizen of Canada after five years —  a full citizen, 
in every sense of the word, invited to share our future but equally 
importantly, our past, warts and all.   The message is simple: you are 
now part of us, and we are all in this together.  We share rights, but 
also responsibilities.  We recognize that everyone has rights, but we 
also accept that when clashes between rights or conflicting interests 
like security arise, the individual exercise of those rights may, by the 
very nature of rights and the social contract, be constrained.  
We need human rights.  Whether we like it or not, religious, 
ethnic and cultural diversity is part of our modern world — and 
increasingly, part of our national and community reality.  Human 
rights and the respect for every individual upon which they rest, offer 
the best hope for reconciling the conflicts this diversity is bound to 
generate.  If we are to live together in peace and harmony — within 
our nations and as nations in the wider world — we must find ways to 
accommodate each other.  Human rights, expressed in the fabric of 
our law and administered by our courts and tribunals, provide a way 
to accomplish this.  
How do we strengthen human rights and counter the critics 
who argue against the compromises and accommodations the practice 
of human rights demands?  I would suggest that we do so as we have 
met social challenges in the past – through our institutions.   
The first line of defence is our legal institutions.  It is through 
the law and the courts that the day-to-day accommodations that 
guarantee human rights in a diverse society are worked out, and our 
differences thus reconciled.  This task places the law and her officers 
at the heart of some of the most sensitive debates of our time.  
Inevitably, it requires lawyers to take unpopular stands, judges to 
make unpopular decisions.  Our challenge is to find the courage to 
discharge this task with integrity. 
                                                           
25 Goodhart, supra note 24. 
26 Globe and Mail, May 2, 2008. 
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The second is through our institutions of citizenship and 
community inclusion.  The minorities among us must be brought into 
the larger political community, made to feel part of the  larger 
enterprise.  Acceptance of the compromises that  human rights imply 
can only work in the long run if there is general agreement that we 
are “all in this together”.   “Rights are not a free lunch —  in a 
democracy, an asserted right can be sustained only if a critical mass of 
the population accepts the corresponding obligations”.27 
 Courageous lawyers and judges; wise and inclusive 
statesmanship — these are ultimate guarantors of our human rights, 
and ultimately, dare I suggest, of peaceful co-existence in our ever-
shrinking world. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Canada, like Ireland, has a long and unique history of the 
protection of human rights. Over the last 75 years, human rights have 
emerged as a central component of our societal and legal systems. 
Together with democratic governance, a free economy and the rule of 
law, human rights have come to define who we are as peoples, and 
what we stand for.  
Despite this achievement — an achievement that I believe 
represents an advance of huge importance in terms of human social 
evolution — the battles for individual liberties and equal respect 
for the worth of each individual are far from finished. Different 
societies face different challenges. Tonight, I have discussed some 
of the challenges we face in Canada. You, in Ireland, face your 
own challenges. By acknowledging those challenges and making 
them part of the democratic dialogue, as we are doing tonight, we 
sustain and strengthen human rights and enhance the world we 
share. 
 
 
 
 
27 Goodhart, supra note 24. 
